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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
RAYMOND GLEN DODGE, : Case No. 20061101-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from two convictions of distribution of a controlled substance and 
one conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, all in drug 
free zones and enhanced to first degree felonies. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a) (West 
2004). Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE 1. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective for introducing evidence that 
defendant personally consumed drugs to support the defense that the drugs found in 
defendant's possession were for his own consumption and not intended for distribution to 
others; and did the trial court plainly err in admitting this evidence? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW. For the first time on appeal, defendant challenges his 
trial counsel's strategic decision to introduce evidence that defendant personally consumed 
drugs. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt], Points I and III, at 14-22 & 28-34. Defendant 
claims that the trial court plainly erred and also asserts that his counsel was ineffective. 
Normally, when an issue is not raised in the trial court, appellate consideration of its 
merits is waived unless the appellant establishes plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 14, 128 P.3d 1171; State v. King, 2006 UT 3, \ 13,131 P.3d 
202. To establish plain error, an appellant must show that (1) trial error occurred (2) which 
should have been obvious to the trial court and (3) prejudiced the outcome of the trial. State 
v.Dunn, 850P.2d 1201,1209 (Utah 1993). Exceptional circumstances arise only in the most 
unusual circumstances, when rare procedural anomalies exist. Id. at 1209 n.3. Neither 
exception applies, however, if appellant's trial counsel invited the error, that is, if "counsel, 
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no 
objection to the [proceedings]." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 14. 
Nevertheless, counsel's actions that invited the alleged error may be reviewed under 
the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ^ f 21 n.2, 61 
P.3d 1062. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that (1) 
his trial counsel's strategic decision was deficient and (2) prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 
See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. Ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on 
appeal differs from the plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions in that the latter 
exceptions permit appellate review of a claim of trial court error, while the former 
constitutional claim permits review of a claim of attorney error. 
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In this case, the invited error doctrine precludes review of defendant's claim of trial 
error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. Only the merits of defendant's claim of attorney error 
may be considered. 
ISSUE 2. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective when he chose not to call John 
Empey, a confidential informant, or Robert Farrell, defendant's co-conspirator, as witnesses 
and did not object to police testimony recounting Empey's and Farrell's out-of-court 
statements concerning their arrangements of the drug sales; and did the trial court plainly err 
in allowing the witnesses not to be called or in admitting their out-of-court statements? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW. Defendant nominally claims a confrontation claim was 
preserved below, but then analyzes the issue under plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See BrAplt., Points II & III, at 22-34. See standards, supra. 
ISSUE 3. Has defendant established a basis to apply the cumulative error doctrine? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Defendant argues reversal is mandated under the 
cumulative error doctrine. See BrAplt, Point IV, at 35-37. The doctrine permits reversal 
of a conviction when multiple errors have "the cumulative effect" of undermining confidence 
that a "fair trial was had." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are reproduced in the Addendum, together with any other 
statutes, rules, or provisions discussed in argument: 
U.S. Const, amend VI; 
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three inter-related drug offenses in a single information 
(R. 1 -2). Count I charged distribution of a controlled substance (heroin) on March 16,2006, 
in a drug free zone, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West 2004) (id.). 
Count II charged possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance (heroin) on May 
17, 2006, in a drug free zone, in violation of section 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (id.). Count III 
charged distribution of a controlled substance (heroin) on May 17, in a drug free zone, in 
violation of section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) (id.). All charges were first-degree felonies (id.) 
A two-day jury trial commenced on November 13, 2006, and resulted in guilty 
verdicts as charged (R. 82-91). Defendant was sentenced to three terms of five-years-to-life 
imprisonment. The terms imposed for the May 17th crimes (Counts II and III) were ordered 
to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the term imposed for the March 16th 
crime (Count I) (R. 91-92; Rl 18: 71-75). Defendant timely appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court, which transferred the matter to this Court (R. 95, 115). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Trust is necessary to purchase illegal drugs (Rl 17:102). Dealers will usually not sell 
drugs to individuals they do not know. Consequently, a potential buyer must personally 
know a dealer or must be introduced to a dealer by someone the dealer trusts (Rl 17:101 -02). 
defendant claims he was prejudiced by the admission of certain evidence. This 
Statement does not include the challenged evidence, but recites only facts unchallenged 
on appeal in the light most favorable to the jury verdicts. 
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The Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force frequently makes undercover purchases 
of illegal drugs by using known drug users to gain access to drug dealers (id). Two types 
of go-betweens are used: (1) a "confidential" informant who knowingly agrees to help the 
police in return for some benefit and (2) an "unwitting" informant who is unaware that he 
is assisting an undercover police investigation (R117: 98, 101-02, 123, 129, 165-66). In 
either case, the go-between's own drug dealer is often the target (Rl 17: 101-02). 
The Strike Force typically pay their confidential informants $100.00 for each 
completed drug purchase (R117: 100-01, 107, 155, 181). A purchase arranged by a 
confidential informant is deemed a "controlled buy" because it occurs under police directive 
and the informant is not criminally liable for his participation (Rl 17: 102, 104-07, 155). 
To initiate a controlled buy, the Force directs the confidential informant to contact the 
targeted dealer to arrange a drug purchase and monitors the telephone call as it is made 
(Rl 17: 106-07). The Force records the serial numbers of the purchase money and searches 
the confidential informant to ensure that he has no drugs or unaccounted-for money on his 
person (Rl 17:107-09). An undercover officer, posing as the informant's friend or associate, 
typically accompanies the confidential informant to the arranged site, meets the targeted 
dealer, and witnesses or participates in the drug purchase (Rl 17: 102-16). 
Other Strike Force officers provide protection for the undercover officer and 
informant during a controlled buy (Rl 17: 111-13). The surveillance team surreptitiously 
positions itself at the pre-arranged site prior to the sale and visually monitors the transaction 
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(id.). The team may also audibly monitor the transaction if the undercover officer is wired 
for sound (id). The surveillance team may arrest the dealer following a successful buy or 
may delay arrest if the undercover investigation is continuing (Rl 17: 119). 
A different scenario occurs when the go-between is an unwitting informant. Because 
an unwitting informant does not know that he is assisting the police, he usually sets up the 
drug purchase independently of the police and may only inform the undercover officer of the 
arrangements minutes before the buy is to occur. The surveillance team must then quickly 
position itself to monitor the transaction (Rl 17: 166-69). Because an unwitting informant 
is a co-conspirator of the targeted dealer, he is criminally liable for his participation in the 
illegal drug sale (Rl 17: 182, 201). 
In the present case, both types of informants were used to arrange drug buys from 
defendant. The first buy occurred on March 16, 2006, using John Empey as a confidential 
informant (Rl 17: 127-29). The second buy occurred two months later, on May 17, 2006, 
using Empey minimally, but primarily relying on Robert Farrell, an "unwitting" informant 
(Rl 17: 163-65). By the time of defendant's trial, Farrell had pled guilty and was imprisoned 
for his participation in the May 17 drug sale (Rl 17: 182). Empey was also incarcerated, but 
not in connection with this case (R117: 99, 152). 
March 16 Drug Sale 
Strike Force Officer Todd Watanabe knew John Empey was a drug user who regularly 
purchased drugs (Rl 17: 98, 102, 123). Watanabe agreed to pay Empey $100.00 for every 
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completed purchase of heroin, methamphetamine, or cocaine Empey arranged for the Force 
and agreed to keep Empey's cooperation confidential (R117: 100-01). In all, Empey 
participated in 20 controlled buys from various individuals (Rl 17: 181). 
On March 16, 2006, Empey, working with Watanabe and Undercover Officer 
Brandon Beck, arranged a controlled buy (Rl 17: 100-02, 105-06,130-31). Before the buy, 
Empey was searched by the police, Beck was wired for sound, and money for the purchase 
was secured from police funds (Rl 17: 104-09). Beck and Empey then drove to the parking 
lot of Stimson's, a local store, where the surveillance team was already in position (Rl 17: 
111-15, 131, 134). As Beck drove into the parking lot, defendant was standing outside his 
car. Beck pulled up next to defendant and the three men got into defendant's car (Rl 17: 
115,135-36). Empey and defendant sat in the front seat; Beck sat in the back, positioned so 
he "could look right between" Empey and defendant and observe their hands (Rl 17:137-3 8). 
As soon as the three were seated in the car, Empey turned back towards Beck. Beck 
then handed Empey a $100.00 bill, which Empey immediately handed to defendant (Rl 17: 
138). Defendant took the money, reached into his pants pocket, pulled out five small baggies 
of heroin, and handed the heroin to Empey (Rl 17: 117, 138-39). Empey kept the heroin 
exposed, "cupped" in his hands, as he handed the drugs to Beck (Rl 17: 138-39). 
Beck asked defendant if the heroin was "good stuff (Rl 17: 140). Defendant replied 
that "he's never had a complaint, but he doesn't use" drugs (id.). Beck asked if, in the future, 
7 
he could buy more drugs from defendant. Defendant said he would first need "to do his 
homework" on Beck and then told Beck to leave (Rl 17: 140-41). 
Beck and Empey got back into Beck's car and drove away (Rl 17:141-42). Defendant 
was allowed to leave without being arrested because the undercover investigation was 
continuing (Rl 17: 119-20). Two months passed before the Strike Force again purchased 
heroin from defendant. 
May 17 Drug Sale and Possession 
On May 17, 2006, Empey introduced Undercover Officer Brian Schultz to Robert 
Farrell under the ruse that Schultz wanted to buy drugs (Rl 17:188-90). Farrell was unaware 
that Schultz was a police officer and agreed to arrange a sale (Rl 17: 166, 191). 
Officer Schultz drove Farrell and Empey to Ogden to purchase the drugs (Rl 17: 191-
92). In Ogden, Farrell twice got out of Schultz's car to make telephone calls (id.). After 
Farrell returned to the car, Schultz drove to a Stop & Shop convenience store (Rl 17: 194). 
En route, Schultz handed Empey a pre-recorded $ 100.00 bill and Empey immediately handed 
the money to Farrell (Rl 17: 180, 192-98). Schultz then dropped Farrell off across the street 
from the Stop & Shop. Farrell walked towards the front of the store. When Schultz could no 
longer see Farrell, he and Empey drove away because the Strike Force did not want Empey 
present if Farrell was arrested (Rl 17: 197, 201). 
Schultz had surreptitiously notified the surveillance team of their destination. By the 
time Schultz reached the Stop & Shop, the surveillance team was in position. The team 
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watched Farrell get out of Schultz's car, cross the street to the front of the store, and meet 
defendant (Rl 17:194-95,198-200,205-12,223; Rl 18: 9). The team watched as Farrell and 
defendant then moved behind pallets in front of the store. It appeared that the two men were 
trying to conceal themselves, but the surveillance team could still see them and could clearly 
observe their hands (R117: 212-13, 223-26, 231-32; R118: 9-12, 17-18). 
Farrell and defendant stood close together, while continuously looking back over their 
shoulders (id). Defendant reached into his shirt pocket and retrieved something which he 
handed to Farrell (id.). Farrell took the object and "pulled something out of his pocket and 
handed it to" defendant (id.). The two then walked down the street in the same direction. 
The surveillance team followed (id.). Defendant walked into a nearby Shopko and was 
immediately arrested by a surveillance team member (R117: 213, 226-27; Rl 18: 12-13). 
Farrell was arrested as he walked towards a nearby restaurant (Rl 17: 214). 
Defendant and Farrell were searched (Rl 17: 215-16). The Strike Force found five 
baggies of heroin on Farrell, which were packaged identically to the five baggies of heroin 
Beck purchased from defendant in March (R117: 215-16). The Strike Force found an 
additional 6.1 grams of heroin on defendant, which was six times the amount of heroin found 
on Farrell or sold to Beck and equaled enough heroin for thirty to forty-five average drug 
uses (Rl 17: 184-86,228-30; Rl 18: 20-26). The $100 bill Schultz had given Farrell minutes 
before was inside defendant's wallet (Rl 17: 180; Rl 18: 15, 60, 64-65). 
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The jury subsequently convicted defendant of selling heroin to Beck in March (Count 
I), of selling heroin to Schultz via Farrell in May (Count III), and of possessing with intent 
to distribute the 6.1 grams of heroin found on defendant at the time of his arrest (Count II). 
The jury also found that the offenses occurred in drug-free zones (R. 86-89; Rl 17: 67-68). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For the first time on appeal, defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
introducing evidence of defendant's long-time drug use, for not calling John Empey and 
Robert Farrell as witnesses, and for not objecting to police testimony recounting Empey's 
and Farrell's out-of-court statements. Defendant also asserts that the trial court plainly erred 
when it failed to override defense counsel's strategic decisions and allowed in this evidence. 
Because defense counsel invited the errors defendant now alleges, defendant is precluded 
from claiming that the trial court plainly erred. Instead, defendant must proceed under the 
rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. Based on these facts, defendant cannot establish 
attorney error, to wit, that his counsel's strategic choices were deficit and prejudicial. 
Therefore, his ineffectiveness claims fail. 
POINT I: Introduction of Defendant's Drug Use. Defendant asserts that his counsel 
was ineffective for introducing evidence of defendant's personal drug consumption because 
drug addiction is not a defense to distribution (Counts I & III). Drug consumption, however, 
may be a defense to possession with intent to distribute (Count II). 
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A charge of possession with intent to distribute requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that (1) the defendant knowingly possessed drugs with (2) the intent to distribute them 
to others. In this case, defendant never disputed that he knowingly possessed the 6.1 grams 
of heroin found on him at the time of his arrest. Only his intent was at issue. 
The prosecutor presented strong evidence establishing that defendant possessed the 
heroin with the requisite intent to distribute it. Nevertheless, evidence that defendant 
personally consumed large amounts of drugs might have eroded this proof. Defense counsel, 
therefore, legitimately chose to portray defendant as a long-time drug user, who might 
possess a large amount of heroin solely for his own consumption. Moreover, whether 
counsel's choice was legitimate or not, admission of this evidence did not prejudice 
defendant; it only made his involvement in drug distribution more understandable. 
POINT II: Failure to Call Empey and Farrell as Witnesses and Failure to Object 
to Their Out-of-Court Statements. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not having 
Empey and Farrell testify, but also admits that any error was invited by defense counsel. 
Consequently, he claims that defense counsel erred in not calling Empey and Farrell as 
witnesses and in not objecting to the admission of their out-of-court statements. According 
to defendant, his counsel's failures violated his right of confrontation and prejudiced the 
outcome of his trial. Because the issue is inadequately briefed, this Court may summarily 
disregard it. Even if its merits are considered, defendant fails to establish that his counsel 
was ineffective. 
11 
Defendant admits that his trial counsel consciously chose not to call Empey and 
Farrell as witnesses. Though he claims that choice was ineffective, he does not allege that 
either, if they had testified, would have exculpated him or would have otherwise challenged 
the prosecution's evidence. In sum, defendant fails to establish that his counsel's choice not 
to call Empey or Farrell was deficient and prejudicial. 
Similarly, defendant fails to establish that counsel's decision not to object to the 
admission of their out-of-court statements was deficient and prejudicial. Here, Empey's and 
Farrell's statements do not constitute "testimonial hearsay" and, therefore, do not implicate 
the Confrontation Clause. The statements do not constitute hearsay because the statements 
were not admitted for their truth, but only admitted to provide background and context to the 
police officers' eyewitness accounts of the two drug sales. Farrell's statements are also not 
testimonial in that they were unwittingly made by a co-conspirator during the commission 
of a crime. Thus, objection would have been futile. 
Moreover, no prejudice resulted from admission of the statements. The statements 
did not establish any element of the charged crimes. Instead, defendant's guilt was 
established by the police officers' eyewitness accounts and the physical evidence. Neither 
the admission nor the sufficiency of this latter evidence is challenged on appeal. 
POINT III: Cumulative Error. The cumulative error doctrine is not applicable in this 
case because there are no multiple errors. Even if multiple errors were established, their 




DEFENSE COUNSEL LEGITIMATELY INTRODUCED EVIDENCE 
THAT DEFENDANT PERSONALLY CONSUMED DRUGS TO 
UNDERMINE EVIDENCE THAT HE INTENDED TO DISTRIBUTE 
THE DRUGS TO OTHERS; IN ANY CASE, EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT USED DRUGS DID NOT UNFAIRLY TAINT 
EVIDENCE THAT HE SOLD DRUGS 
Defendant admits that he did not object below to the admission of evidence that he 
personally consumed and was addicted to drugs. Indeed, he concedes that his trial counsel 
actively sought the introduction of this evidence. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 14,16, 
19-20 & 31-32. Nevertheless, he claims for the first time on appeal that its admission was 
erroneous and unfairly prejudiced the outcome of his trial. See Br.Aplt., Points I & III. 
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order 
to preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 14,128 P.3d 1171 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). When an appellant fails to object at trial, his claim 
of error is considered waived. See State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^ f 31, 137 P.3d 716. 
The preservation rule, however, has two exceptions: plain error and exceptional 
circumstances. State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^ J13; 131 P.3d 202. To establish plain error, the 
appellant must show "(I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). The 
exceptional circumstances exception "applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies." Id. 
at 1209 n.3 (citing State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah App. 1991)). 
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Accordingly, appellate courts employ this exception sparingly, "reserving it for the most 
unusual circumstances where [the Court's] failure to consider an issue that was not properly 
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 
2004 UT 29, \ 23, 94 P.3d 186. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
A litigant may go further than not preserving an error in the trial court; he may invite 
it. "Under the doctrine of invited error, [this Court has] declined to engage in even plain 
error review when [trial] counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the 
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 
14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]here invited error butts up against 
manifest injustice [or plain error], the invited error rule prevails," State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991). 
"Of course, if [trial] counsel's decision in leading the [trial] court into error falls 
below the standard of reasonable professional practice," the attorney's conduct may be 
reviewed under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. To 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must affirmatively "demonstrate, 
' first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced' him." Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, f^ 
18, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988), and citing 
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Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Whether this burden has been met presents 
a question of law. State v. Marble, 2007 UT App 82, f 7, 157 P.3d 371. 
While some components of the plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions 
are similar to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the focus of their analysis differs 
significantly. The plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions permit appellate 
review of an unpreserved claim of trial court error. In contrast, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel permits review of a claim of attorney error. 
(A) Herej Invited Error Precludes Plain Error Review, But Permits a Claim 
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel to Be Raised. 
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it allowed the defense to 
introduce evidence that defendant was a drug user without first conducting a prejudice 
inquiry pursuant to rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. See Br.Aplt. at 14-22. 
At the same time, defendant admits that his trial counsel affirmatively chose to 
introduce this evidence and acknowledges that plain error review is precluded under the 
invited error doctrine. See BrAplt. at 12-15, 20, 31-34. See also R117: 124-25, 144-48; 
Rl 18: 16-17 (defense counsel's attempts to introduce evidence of defendant's drug use). 
Though invited error precludes plain error review, see Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1206, defendant 
may claim that his counsel was ineffective for inviting any error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
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1220. Consequently, defendant's claim of attorney error is fairly before the Court. See 
Br.Aplt. at 31-34. Based on this record, however, the claim fails.2 
(B) Defendant's Personal Consumption of Drugs Was a Defense to 
Possession with Intent to Distribute (Count II) and, Therefore, His 
Counsel's Strategic Choice to Introduce this Evidence was Reasonable. 
"An attorney's performance is deficient if' counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'" 
Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, ^ f 19 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "The seriousness of 
those errors is measured by whether 'counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). "In making this 
assessment, ca court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 
2Though admitting that his claim was not preserved below and invited by counsel, 
defendant suggests that a "hybrid situation" may exist here because the prosecutor 
allegedly objected to the admission of the evidence. See Br.Aplt. at 15 (citing Rl 17: 
146). The record does not support defendant's claim. SeeKill: 146 (reflectingthat 
prosecutor objected to the form of a question defense counsel asked about what facts 
might indicate personal drug use as opposed to an intent to distribute). But even if the 
prosecutor had raised a rule 403 objection, a contention that evidence unfairly prejudices 
the prosecution does not put a court on notice that evidence unfairly prejudices the 
defense. Compare State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, If 24, 108 P.2d 730 (requiring a rule 403 
inquiry when the prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts to prove 
identity, motive, or another proper non-character person pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence), with State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1012 (Utah App. 1994) 
(recognizing that "[a] defendant has a right to adduce evidence [of other crimes] that 
would tend to disprove a specific intent to commit a crime"). 
Defendant also nominally refers to the exceptional circumstances exception. See 
Br.Aplt. at 21. Because defendant asserts no "substantial... procedural anomaly" to 
invoke the exception, see Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 23, the State does not 
address it. See State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ 13, 72 P.3d 138 (refusing to address 
inadequately briefed issues). 
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the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy."5 Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, because 
"'[counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made 
by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant^ the] court must make 'every 
effort... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time.'" Id. at \ 20 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 & 691). See also Marble, 2007 UT 
App 82, ^ 12 & 15 (holding that given the "'variety of circumstances faced by defense 
counsel,' a conscious choice not to object to arguably inadmissible testimony may, at times, 
fall within 'the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant'") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Defense counsel's strategic choices will 
not be rejected on appeal unless there exists '"no reasonable basis for them.'" State v. Leber, 
2007 UT App 273, f 17, 584 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 
282 (Utah 1995)). 
Defendant argues that there was no reasonable basis to introduce evidence of his drug 
use because drug addiction is not a defense to drug distribution (Counts I & III). See Br.Aplt. 
at 16, 18 & 31. However, defendant's personal drug use tended to show that he lacked an 
intent to distribute (Count II). 
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Count II required the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 6.1 
grams of heroin found on defendant at the time of his arrest were not for defendant's own 
consumption, but intended for distribution to others. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iii). See also State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah App. 1998), affirmed, 985 
P.2d 911 (Utah 1999) (recognizing that possession with intent has two elements: that the 
defendant (1) knowingly and intentionally possesses a controlled substance with (2) the 
specific intent to distribute the substance to another); State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238,241 (Utah 
App. 1995) (recognizing that all surrounding circumstances, and not just the quantity of 
drugs possessed, is determinative of an intent to distribute). 
In this case, strong evidence established the requisite intent to distribute. Officer 
Watanabe testified that 6.1 grams of heroin would supply an "average" addict with 30-40 
uses, depending "on the user and - and how addicted he is" (Rl 17: 186). It was also six 
times more in weight than the heroin purchased by Undercover Officer Beck in March or 
Farrell in May (R118: 20-26). These facts fairly support that 6.1 grams of heroin is more 
than the amount expected to be possessed for personal consumption. Additionally, 
Undercover Officer Beck testified that defendant told him in March that he did not use drugs, 
which would substantially negate that the heroin found on defendant in May was for his own 
use (Rl 17: 140). And an intent to distribute the 6.1 grams of heroin could fairly be inferred 
from the existence of the March and May sales. See Statement of Facts at 6-9. Given this 
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evidence, conviction of Count II was ensured unless the defense raised a reasonable doubt 
about defendant's intent to distribute. 
Defense counsel legitimately chose to create that doubt by establishing that defendant 
was a long-time heroin user, who could easily consume more than the "normal" amount of 
heroin. See Olsen, 869 P.2d at 1012 (recognizing that "[a] defendant has a right to adduce 
evidence [of other crimes] that would tend to disprove a specific intent to commit a crime"). 
At the same time, defense counsel did not want defendant to testify and face cross-
examination on all three charges or possible exposure of his full drug history that dated back 
to the 1950fs (Rl 18: 30-31, 72-73). Instead, counsel attempted to elicit evidence of 
defendant's drug history from police officers who had known defendant for years (Rl 17: 
124-25; Rl 18: 16-17). Counsel also attempted to elicit general information about addiction 
from other officers based on their training and experience (R117: 144-48). When this 
questioning failed to establish defendant's long-term history of addiction, defense counsel 
chose to introduce a limited portion of defendant's criminal record—two convictions for drug 
possession—to show that defendant had at times possessed drugs simply for his own use 
(R117: 145, 154-55). Counsel was then able to argue that 6.1 grams of heroin was not 
necessarily a large amount of heroin for defendant to possess or consume: 
[Defense Counsel]: Thirty uses ain't that much for a junkie. If someone's 
gonna use it 30 times, and you're [defendant's] age, 70 years old, 30 uses to 
him, gees, he could probably do that in eight days. Three times a day. 
Minimum. For him, that may have just been his week's supply. Who knows? 
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(Rl 18: 54). In sum, defense counsel followed a classic defense to possession with intent to 
distribute—when he could not deny defendant's possession, he denied defendant's intent. 
See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 423 (1970) (recognizing that an intent to 
distribute is not established when it is equally consistent that the drugs possessed are for 
personal consumption); United States v. Kates, 174 F.3d 580, 582 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that while a quantity of drugs "too large to be used by the defendant alone" supports an intent 
to distribute, an amount consistent with personal use does not absent other evidence); United 
States v. Hunt, 129 F.3d 739,744 (5th Cir. 1997) (reversing a conviction for possession with 
intent to distribute where the evidence was consistent with personal use despite the 
defendant's prior denial that he used drugs). 
Moreover, because the jury did not have the option of returning a verdict of simple 
possession (R. 3-80), defendant would have been acquitted of Count II if the defense strategy 
had worked. The fact that the strategy did not work does not diminish the reasonableness of 
its choice. See State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, \ 43,112 P.3d 1252 (recognizing that 
the ultimate success of a given trial strategy does not determine its reasonableness). 
(C) Given the Limited Defenses to the Distribution Charges (Counts I & III), 
Defense Counsel Reasonably Portrayed Defendant as an Addict to Make the 
Defense's Other Claims More Credible and Gain the Sympathy of the Jury. 
Evidence of defendant's drug use not only provided a viable defense to Count II, where 
no defense otherwise existed, it also generally benefitted the defense of Counts I and III. See 
20 
State v. Vos, 2007 UT App 215,114, 164 P.3d 1258 (recognizing that the reasonableness of 
counsel's strategic choices is limited by the evidence in a given case). 
The issue of personal drug use first emerged during voir dire and continued as a theme 
throughout the trial. During jury selection, the court asked the venire members about their 
exposure to illegal drugs (Rl 17: 31). Nineteen members had either personally used drugs or 
had family members or close friends who had been involved with drugs (Rl 17:32-41). Many 
felt that this experience might affect them and one felt the penalties for drug possession were 
too harsh (id.). The prosecutor was then allowed to directly question the venire. The 
prosecutor in a series of questions focused on the venire's attitudes towards drugs, drug users, 
and drug dealers (Rl 17: 48-53). When one venire member repeated that he felt some drug 
penalties might be too harsh, the prosecutor asked if he believed that the law should 
differentiate between a drug user who sold drugs and a non-user who sold drugs (Rl 17:51). 
The venire member said a non-drug-user who sold drugs as a business was worse (Rl 17:51-
52). The prosecutor then asked the entire venire if they agreed: 
[Prosecutor]: Okay. Anybody else feel like it is, you know, all bets are off on 
whether sentencing is too harsh if the person we're trying before you is charged 
as a drug seller and not a drug user? Do you think that we should be less harsh 
or more harsh on people that sell drugs only? 
The Jury Panel: More. 
[Prosecutor]: By show of hands on drug sellers rather than drug users. 
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(Rl 17: 52).3 Subsequently, defense counsel asked a slightly different question: 
[Defense Counsel]: Now, [the prosecutor] talked a lot about the difference 
between a drug user and a drug dealer. Does anyone have a problem with 
someone who is a drug user who also deals to support their habit? Is that 
different than someone who just deals to make a profit? 
(Rl 17: 62-63). Two venire members indicated that this could make a difference (id.).4 
Defense counsel later objected to the prosecutor's voir dire questions about dealers 
who were non-drug-users (R117: 76). The prosecutor revealed that he would introduce 
evidence that defendant did not personally use drugs, but only sold drugs for profit (id). The 
court noted that whether a dealer also uses drugs makes no legal difference, but ruled that the 
prosecutor's voir dire inquiries were relevant based on the venire's expressed views and 
experiences (R117: 76-77). 
As promised, the prosecutor introduced evidence that defendant denied using drugs 
(Rl 17: 140). Defense counsel attempted to neutralize the inference that defendant was the 
worst type of dealer—a non-drug-user who dealt drugs purely for profit—by introducing 
evidence and then arguing that the 70-year old defendant was sick from his own addiction and 
needed help (Rl 17: 124-24, 144-48; Rl 18: 16-17,54-55). 
3The record suggests that multiple members of the panel responded, "more," but 
does not indicate how many ultimately raised their hands (Rl 17: 52). 
4Both were subsequently removed: one for cause based on his views of the drug 
laws and the second because defense counsel represented her son in a drug trial which 
resulted in the son's conviction and imprisonment (Rl 17: 68). 
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And though drug addiction is not a legal defense to distribution (Counts I & III), 
introduction of this evidence nevertheless created a more favorable environment to argue that 
reasonable doubt existed as to Count III, the May sale. Eyewitness testimony established that 
Farrell and defendant exchanged something before both were arrested. Immediately 
thereafter, Farrell possessed five baggies of heroin, that were packaged identically to the five 
baggies of heroin defendant sold Beck in March. Additionally, defendant had the $100 bill 
that Undercover Officer Shultz had just given Farrell to buy heroin. See Statement of Facts, 
supra. Faced with this evidence, defense counsel argued that the money Farrell gave 
defendant could have been for any number of innocent reasons; that no one saw defendant 
give drugs to Farrell; and that Farrell may have possessed the five baggies of heroin before 
he met defendant (Rl 18: 52-53). Evidence that defendant used drugs bolstered counsel's 
argument regarding Count III because the defense also argued that the heroin 
contemporaneously found on defendant was defendant's own stash and not the source of the 
heroin found on Farrell (Rl 18: 54). 
In closing, defense counsel returned to the theme that defendant's addiction was to be 
more pitied than punished: 
[Defense Counsel]:... And the State made a big deal when we're picking the 
jury and we're doing this in opening argument that, hey, this isn't just a drug 
user, this is a guy that's dealing drugs. Does it matter that he's having to sell 
drugs to support his habit? Now they're saying the other side, you know what, 
it doesn't really matter, he's still selling drugs, period. 
Well, you know what, unfortunately, that's kind of what happens 
sometimes. Doesn't make Ray a perfect individual. Means he's got a problem. 
He's sick. He needs some help. Where he's gonna get that help, I don't know. 
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My guess is, he'll get it from some institution somewhere, whether it be the 
Weber County Jail or the Utah State Prison or Weber Human Services, he'll get 
some help somewhere. Okay. But the fact is, he did something - or at least the 
State says he did something, and then they're trying to convince you that this 
guy's just a dealer. But his own record includes that he's also been convicted 
ofpossession. 
(R115: 55). 
Though an appeal to sympathy is not a legal defense to distribution, it is a viable trial 
strategy, especially when no other exists. The evidence establishing that defendant sold drugs 
to Undercover Officer Beck in March (Count I) was overwhelming. See Statement of Facts 
at 6-8. The evidence establishing that defendant sold drugs to Farrell in May (Count III) and 
possessed 6.1 grams of heroin with the intent to distribute it (Count II) was very strong. See 
id. at 8-9. Despite the low probability of success, defense counsel "attempted to make the best 
of a bad situation, given his very limited options." See In reAlcox, 137 Cal.App.4th 657,669 
(Cal. App. 2006). See also People v. Scott, 939 P.2d 354, 369-70 (Cal. 1997) (recognizing 
that counsel may reasonably need to make difficult or unusual tactical decisions when faced 
with little or no defense); People v. Ahl, 243 A.D.2d 985,987 (N.Y.A.D. 1997) (recognizing 
that an appellate court must judge a claim of ineffectiveness from the "perspective" of the 
"limited options" available to trial counsel). Here, the best option was to make his 70-year-
old addicted client more sympathetic and, thus, any defenses to Counts II and III more 
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credible.5 SeeAlcox, 137 Cal.App.4th at 668 ("It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for 
counsel to admit obvious weaknesses in the defense case"). 
(D) In Any Case, Introduction of Defendant's Personal Drug Use Did Not 
Prejudice the Outcome of this Multi-Charge Distribution Trial. 
In any case, evidence of defendant's drug use did not prejudice the outcome of the trial. 
See Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, ^  23 (reaffirming that "[e]ven if an attorney's performance was 
deficient, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will fail if counsel's deficiencies have 
no effect on the outcome of the proceeding"). 
To meet the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant 
must affirmatively establish that "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182,187 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (other citation 
omitted). "In making this determination, an appellate court should consider the totality of the 
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary 
picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." 
Id. at 187. "And as with the first prong of the Strickland standard, there is a 'strong 
presumption' that the outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable." Benvenuto, 2007 UT 
53, ^ 23 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699). 
5There was no viable defense to Count I. 
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As set forth in the Statement of Facts and discussed, supra, other unchallenged 
evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant sold drugs to Beck in March (Count I). 
Strong evidence also established that defendant sold drugs to Farrell in May (Count III), and 
possessed with the intent to distribute 6.1 grams of heroin when arrested (Count II). 
Consequently, evidence that defendant personally used the heroin he distributed did not 
adversely impact the jury's determination—it only made his involvement in distribution more 
understandable. 
POINT II 
DEFENSE COUNSEL LEGITIMATELY CHOSE NOT TO CALL 
EMPEY OR FARRELL AS WITNESSES AND NOT TO OBJECT TO 
THE ADMISSION OF THEIR OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS; AND 
IN ANY CASE, NO PREJUDICE RESULTED 
Defendant contends that his right to confrontation as guaranteed under the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated when Empey and Farrell did not 
testify and their out-of-court statements were admitted through others' testimony. See 
Br.Aplt., Points II & III Defendant admits, however, that it was his own counsel who 
stipulated that Empey and Farrell need not be called by the prosecution, his own counsel who 
affirmatively chose not to call Empey and Farrell as defense witnesses, and his own counsel 
who did not object to the admission of Empey's or Farrell's out-of-court statements. See 
Br.Aplt. at 28 & 32. Nevertheless, defendant suggests that a confrontation claim may have 
been raised when defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant did not agree with 
counsel's tactical decision not to call Empey and Farrell as witnesses. See Br.Aplt. at 28. At 
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the same time, defendant admits "that, due to the wording of this objection, this issue also may 
be considered invited error" and plain error review precluded. See id. Consequently, 
defendant argues that his counsel's strategic choices not to call Empey and Farrell and not to 
object to the admission of their statements were ineffective in that they resulted in the loss of 
his right of confrontation. See Br.Aplt. at 2 & 28-35. Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails. 
(A) Defendant Did Not Preserve a Confrontation Claim Below and Invited 
Error Precludes Plain Error Review on Appeal; But Defendant May Claim 
that His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective. 
Generally, when an issue is not preserved below, it may be considered on appeal only 
if the defendant establishes plain error or otherwise raises a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel. See discussion of standards at 13-15. 
Here, the record reflects that while defendant may have disagreed with defense 
counsel's strategic decision not to have Empey or Farrell testify, he did not object to the 
admission of their out-of-court statements. Nor did the disagreement between counsel and 
client preserve a confrontation claim. As will be explained, infra, the disagreement only 
establishes that the errors defendant now alleges were invited and plain error review is 
precluded. Thus, the issue is whether counsel was ineffective for making those choices. 
Empey was a paid confidential informant who set up and participated in the March 
drug sale and tricked his roommate, Farrell, intoassistingthepoliceinMay(R117: 101,127-
40, 165, 190-91). By the time of defendant's trial, Empey was incarcerated at the Utah State 
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Prison for a parole violation unrelated to this case (Rl 17: 99). Farrell had pled guilty to 
distribution in connection with the May sale and was incarcerated (Rl 17: 182). 
At trial, Officer Watanabe recounted several out-of-court statements made to him by 
Empey. Watanabe testified that Empey was a known drug user who told him that he wanted 
to work as a confidential informant because he wanted to "get [drugs] off of the streets" 
(R117: 100). Despite Empey's claimed altruistic motive, Watanabe classified him as a 
"mercenary informant" and paid him $100 for each successful drug purchase he arranged 
(R117: 100-01). 
Watanabe testified that in March 2006, Empey told Watanabe that he could purchase 
drugs from defendant (Rl 17: 97). Watanabe proceeded to organize an undercover controlled 
buy which targeted defendant and used Officer Brandon Beck in an undercover capacity 
(R117: 102-05). 
Watanabe testified that he and other members of the Force listened to Empey as he 
telephoned to set up the purchase (Rl 17: 105-06). After the call, Empey told Watanabe and 
the other officers that he had spoken to defendant and that defendant wanted the sale to take 
place at the parking lot of Stimson's, a local store (Rl 17: 106). Watanabe and the Strike 
Force surveillance team followed Empey and Beck to Stimson's, where they saw and heard 
(via Beck's audio wire) the two get out of Beck's car, meet defendant, who was waiting in the 
parking lot, and the three men get into defendant's car (Rl 17: 111-15). Watanabe did not 
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relate what occurred inside the car, but testified that a few minutes later, Beck and Empey got 
back into Beck's car and drove away to meet Watanabe (Rl 17: 116). 
Undercover Officer Brandon Beck next testified to his involvement in the March 
heroin purchase (Count I). He also recounted several out-of-court statements made to him by 
Empey. Beck explained that he needed someone like Empey to set up the purchase because 
Beck could not directly deal with defendant (Rl 17: 127-29). Beck testified that he heard 
Empey make the telephone call, after which Empey told Beck that he had spoken to defendant 
and they were to meet him at Stimson's parking lot (Rl 17: 130-31). Beck drove Empey to 
the parking lot and as they pulled in, Empey pointed to a man who was standing outside a 
parked car and said, "There's Ray" (Rl 17: 131, 134-35). Beck pulled up next to the man, 
who Beck identified as defendant, and Beck and Empey got out of Beck's car (R135-36). 
Defendant, Empey, and Beck then got into defendant's car (Rl 17: 136). 
Beck was in the backseat, but situated himself so he could clearly see both defendant 
and Empey's hands and could hear anything they said to each other (Rl 17: 136-38). Empey 
turned back towards Beck and asked for the drug purchase money (Rl 17:138). Beck handed 
Empey $100, which Empey "right away" handed to defendant (Rl 17:138-39). Seconds after 
defendant received the money, defendant handed five baggies of heroin to Empey, who 
immediately handed the drugs to Beck (Rl 17: 138-40). Beck asked defendant if the heroin 
was good and if Beck could purchase more in the future; defendant responded that he did not 
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use drugs and he would need to check out Beck (Rl 17: 140-41). Beck and Empey left and 
Beck turned over the heroin to Watanabe (Rl 17: 141-42). 
No objections were raised when Watanabe and Beck testified to Empey's out-of-court 
statements. 
After both officers testified, the prosecutor approached the court outside the presence 
of the jury. The prosecutor explained that even though Empey had previously indicated he 
did not want to testify, he had been transported from the prison and was present at the 
courthouse (Rl 17:152). The prosecutor had spoken to Empey, but he continued to refuse to 
testify (id). Defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor's characterization. 
[Defense Counsel]: I spoke to [Empey] as well, your honor, to see if he might 
be willing to perhaps testify on behalf of Mr. Dodge. His words to me were he 
wasn't going to testify for or against Ray Dodge. He just didn't want anything 
to do with it. I think it's more of a safety issue than anything else. 
(R117: 152).6 Both parties then stipulated that Empey could be released from the 
prosecution's subpoena and returned to the prison (Rl 17: 152-53). 
Defense counsel informed the court that he had discussed the matter with defendant, 
who wanted to force Empey to testify: 
[Defense Counsel]: . . .[defendant] is under the impression that he has a right 
to face his accuser, and his accusers, in his mind, are Mr. Farrell and Mr. 
Empey. In my mind, his accusers are the Weber County - Weber-Morgan 
Strike Force. But just to make record of that particular issue, he believes he's 
6No one claimed that Empey feared defendant, only that Empey was incarcerated 
and did not want to be labeled a snitch. 
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not being allowed the right to face his accusers, being Mr. Empey and Mr. 
Farrell. 
(Rl 17: 153). The prosecutor agreed that the Strike Force officers were the witnesses who 
would establish the requisite elements of the crime and, therefore, were defendant's 
"accusers." Empey and Farrell were only incidental witnesses who brought the Strike Force 
and defendant together (Rl 17: 153-54). The trial court agreed. 
[The court]: I agree. Probably would be preferable if Mr. Empey would testify, 
but his choosing not to puts the State actually at a disadvantage if he was going 
to testify adverse to - to Mr. Dodge. And if they can prove their case without 
[Empey], they're entitled to do so. And that's what we're here for, to see if the 
jury will be persuaded, without the testimony of Mr. Empey, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. So any motion is denied and you may proceed. 
(Rl 17: 154). Neither defendant nor defense counsel raised further objection. 
Officer Watanabe was then recalled by the prosecution to explain the circumstances 
of the May buy (Count III) and defendant's arrest and possession of 6.1 grams of heroin 
(Count II). Watanabe testified that Empey told him that he could no longer arrange sales from 
defendant because defendant was upset that Empey brought Beck in March (R117: 165). 
Watanabe further testified that on May 17, Empey called Watanabe and said his roommate, 
Robert Farrell, could purchase heroin from defendant (R117: 165-67). Watanabe then 
directed Empey to introduce Undercover Officer Shultz, posing as a potential buyer, to Farrell 
(id). No objection was raised to this testimony. 
Undercover Officer Schultz testified to what transpired next. Shultz testified that when 
he and Empey met Farrell, Farrell agreed to purchase drugs for Schultz (R117: 188-91). 
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Farrell told Schultz to drive to Ogden and then twice told Shultz to stop so he could telephone 
the dealer, who Farrell said was defendant (Rl 17: 191-94). After the calls, Farrell directed 
Schultz to drive to a Stop & Shop and told Schultz to stay in the car because defendant would 
be nervous if Schultz accompanied him (R117: 192 & 197). No objection was raised to 
Schultz's testimony. 
Watanabe and other members of the surveillance team testified to what they observed 
when Farrell and defendant met in front of the Stop & Shop and about their subsequent 
arrests. See Statement of Facts at 8-9. 
In sum, no confrontation objection was raised below. At best, defendant simply 
disagreed with his counsel's decision not to force Empey and Farrell to testify. But 
defendant's desire to face Empey and Farrell, whom defendant described as his "accusers," 
was not based on the Confrontation Clause, but on defendant's sense of justice. As defendant 
apparently saw it, two men he trusted had betrayed him. His apparent revenge was to force 
them to testify because they feared for their safety if they did. See Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 
64,68 (Utah 1984) (recognizing "the substantial risks that informers in prisons run when they 
cooperate with [government] officials"). At the same time, defendant voiced no concern 
about the admission of their out-of-court statements. Indeed, when defense counsel informed 
the court of defendant's disagreement with his decision not to call Empey or Farrell, Empey's 
out-of-court statements had already been admitted without objection. Likewise, Farrell's 
statements were subsequently admitted without objection. Because no confrontation claim 
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was preserved below and any errors invited, the issue on appeal is limited to ineffectiveness: 
has defendant established that his counsel's strategic choices resulted in the loss of 
defendant's right of confrontation and prejudiced the outcome of the trial? 
(B) Defendant's Claim of Ineffectiveness is Not Adequately Briefed and 
Should Be Summarily Rejected. 
This Court has consistently required appellants to strictly comply with rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, If 13. Rule 24 requires appellants 
to submit a brief containing "not just bald citation to authority but development of that 
authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." West Jordan City v. Goodman, 
2006 UT 27, Tf 29, 135 P.3d 874 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "An issue 
is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the 
burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ^ 13. 
When an appellant's brief "fails to cite relevant legal authority or provide any meaningful 
analysis" regarding the issue presented, this Court has "routinely declined" to consider the 
argument. State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, ^ 27, 989 P.2d 503 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Here, defendant has failed to comply with rule 24 in presenting his 
ineffectiveness claim; therefore, the claim should be summarily rejected. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must affirmatively establish 
that "his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner . . . [and] 
that counsel's performance prejudiced him." Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, \ 18 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Here, defendant claims that his counsel's decision not to 
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call Empey and Farrell as witnesses and not to object to the admission of their statements 
resulted in the loss of his right of confrontation as articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004). See Br.Aplt. at 22-34. Thus, to succeed on his ineffectiveness claim, 
defendant must establish the underlying confrontation violation and show how that violation 
changed the outcome of the trial. Without a confrontation violation, defendant cannot 
establish either prong of his ineffectiveness claim. See Marble, 2007 UT App 82, f^ 12 
(reaffirming that proof of an ineffectiveness requires proof of a underlying prejudicial error). 
Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, Crawford bars the 
"admission of testimonial statements of a witness who [does] not appear at trial unless he was 
unavailable to testify, and the defendant [had] a prior opportunity for cross-examination." 541 
U.S. at 53-54. The Clause as interpreted by Crawford sots a constitutional restriction on when 
one type of out-of-court statement—testimonial hearsay—may be admitted pursuant to 
evidentiary rule if the declarant does not testify at trial. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 
2266,2273 (2006). But neither Crawford nor tho Confrontation Clause demand that a witness 
be called at trial. Nevertheless, defendant asserts that the failure to call a witness violates 
confrontation.7 See Br.Aplt. at 23-25. Moreover, defendant does not analyze the impact of 
invited error on his confrontation claim. See Salt Lake v. Williams, 2005 UT App 493, fflf 
7Defendant cites to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) and State v. Moosman, 
19A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), whose confrontation analyses are necessarily modified by the 
Supreme Court's more recent Crawford decision. But both cases—like 
Crawford—address only the constitutional admissibility of a non-testifying declarant's 
out-of-court statements. They do not require that a particular witness be called. 
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28-29,128 P.3d 47 (holding that a confrontation claim may be waived if the alleged violation 
was invited by defense counsel). 
Similarly, defendant presumes that the admission of any out-of-court statement 
necessarily implicates confrontation. See Br.Aplt. at 24-27. But neither Crawford nor the 
Confrontation Clause bar the admission of all out-of-court statements. Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 51. For example, "[t]he Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the 
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain" the out-of-court statement. Id. at 59 n.9. Nor 
does the Clause "bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the 
truth of the matter asserted." Id. Rather, Crawford deals "solely with the Confrontation 
Clause implications of the admission of testimonial hearsay." State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11, 
U 17, 131 P.3d 232. Thus, whether an out-of-court statement is offered for its truth, is 
testimonial, was subject to cross-examination, was made by a witness who testifies at trial or 
by a witness who is legally unavailable are all critical factors in analyzing a Confrontation 
Clause issue. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-80; Williams, 2005 UT App 493, fflf 11-25. A 
defendant claiming a violation of the Confrontation Clause must demonstrate that: (1) the 
challenged statement was offered for its truth, (2) the statement was testimonial, (3) the 
statement's declarant did not appear at trial, (4) the declarant was not legally unavailable and 
(5) the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See id. Moreover, 
if the alleged violation underlies an ineffectiveness claim, as it does here, the defendant must 
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also establish that his counsel's failure to assert the confrontation claim was not only 
unreasonable, but prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See Marble, 2007 UT App 82, \ 12. 
Here, defendant has not addressed the Crawford factors nor applied them to his 
Strickland claim. Instead, he presumes without analysis that Empey's and FarrelPs 
statements were offered for their truth. See Br.Aplt. at 23-32 (baldly asserting that all of 
Empey's and FarrelPs statements constituted "hearsay"). He also asserts, without analysis, 
that the statements are testimonial and constitutionally barred from admission under 
Crawford. See Br.Aplt. at 27. With only minimal analysis, defendant then concludes that his 
counsel was "oblivious to the issues . . . regarding hearsay and confrontation," "was not 
cognizant of this area of the law," and, therefore, was ineffective. See Br.Aplt. at 32. He 
claims prejudicial attorney error because "[virtually the entire substance of evidence 
produced at trial was hearsay" and alleges that Empey was the only person to witness 
defendant's crimes. See id. at 24. He also asserts that defense counsel had no opportunity to 
show Empey's and FarrelPs biases or motives. See id. at 24-25. But as will be discussed, the 
record does not support defendant's factual and legal assertions. Nor do such sweeping 
generalities satisfy the thoughtful analysis required of Crawford and Strickland. 
In sum, defendant's failure to adequately brief his ineffectiveness claim based on an 
alleged confrontation violation justifies its summary rejection. See Goodman, 2006 UT 27, 
f 29 ; Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ^ 13. Alternatively, the claim lacks merit. 
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(C) Defense Counsel Made a Reasonable Tactical Decision Not to Call 
Empey or Farrell to Testify. 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Empey or Farrell 
as witnesses and for not objecting to the admission of their out-of-court statements. 
Defendant claims that his counsel's failures violated his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation and prejudiced the outcome of his trial. See Br.Aplt. at 22-35. Though he 
nominally cites to the state confrontation provision, article 1, f 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
he does not premise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the state constitution. See 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, \ 16, 164 P.3d 397 (reaffirming that more than nominal 
reference is necessary to present a state constitutional claim). Instead, defendant argues only 
that counsel's alleged deficiencies violated his federal right to confrontation as set forth in 
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. See Br.Aplt. at 27 & 32. 
As will be more fully discussed in the next subsection, Crawford focuses on when an 
out-of-court statement offered for its truth may be admitted without violating the 
Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-54; State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11, Tj 17, 
131 P.3d 232. It does not, however, compel that any witness be called to testify. Rather, 
Crawford delineates only when a non-testifying declarant's out-of-court statements may be 
constitutionally admitted. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273. 
Consequently, confrontation is not implicated in the first part of defendant's argument 
on appeal: that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Empey and Farrell as witnesses 
and for stipulating to Empey's release from the prosecutor's subpoena. See Br.Aplt. at 2-3, 
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23-27 & 31-34. Instead, defendant's insistence below that he wanted Empey and Farrell to 
testify provides only the basis for a general claim of attorney error. See, e.g., Leber, 2007 UT 
App 273, \ 19 (recognizing that the decision of what witnesses to call normally falls within 
counsel's legitimate tactical decisions). Based on these facts, defendant's ineffectiveness 
claim fails. 
"In challenging counsel's effectiveness, 'a convicted defendant must identify the acts 
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 
judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the 
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.'" Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, \ 20 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Of 
course, counsel must at least explore "the possibility of procuring prospective defense 
witnesses," before he can make a "reasonable decision to call or not to call particular 
witnesses for tactical reasons." Templin, 805 P.2d at 188. Here, defense counsel reasonably 
explored the possibility of Empey and Farrell testifying before he made the legitimate tactical 
decision not to call them. 
Empey worked as a paid confidential informant and successfully completed 20 
controlled buys, only two of which involved defendant (R117: 100-01, 181). Though he 
arranged and witnessed the March buy, his role included little more. See Statement of Facts 
at 6-8. Empey's involvement in the May sale was even more minimal: he introduced 
Undercover Officer Schultz to Farrell, but left before Farrell met defendant. See Statement 
38 
of Facts at 8-9. By the time of trial, Empey had his own problems. He was imprisoned on a 
parole violation and did not want to testify for fear he would be labeled a snitch (Rl 17: 99, 
152-53). Likewise, Farrell had pled guilty to his role in the May sale and was incarcerated 
(Rl 17: 82). On this record, it appears that Farrell also did not want to testify for safety 
reasons (Rl 17: 152-53; Rl 18: 53). 
Defense counsel spoke with Empey and determined that his testimony would not help 
the defense (Rl 17:152). Only at that point did defense counsel determine not to call Empey. 
Similarly, defense counsel knew that Farrell had confessed to his role in the May sale and had 
named his co-conspirator, the person who sold him the drugs (Rl 17: 82, 217). Though the 
record does not indicate the person Farrell named, the record does not suggest—and defendant 
does not claim—that it was anyone other than defendant. 
Based on these facts, counsel's decision not to have Empey or Farrell testify was 
reasonable. As the trial court noted, if Empey had testified, he was expected to testify 
"against" defendant (Rl 17: 154). Likewise, if Farrell had testified, he presumptively would 
have testified that he used Shultz's $100 to buy five baggies of heroin on May 17 at the Stop 
& Shop. Neither testimony would have benefitted defendant. Instead, as defense counsel 
recognized in closing, it was their absence which helped the defense: 
[Defense Counsel]: No one's ever heard either one of the C.I.'s or the 
confidential informant [Empey] or the unwitting [Farrell] have ever said that 
Ray sold them drugs. Neither one of them ever testified. They never provided 
a written statement of any kind. Sol want you to weigh that and decide, gees, 
if they're not willing to come to court, how trustworthy are these two? 
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(Rl 18: 54-55). 
Nevertheless, for the first time on appeal, defendant speculates that if Empey and 
Farrell had testified, defense counsel would have been able to "establish[] [their] biases, 
inconsistencies, and possible ulterior motives" in arranging the sales. See Br.Aplt. at 24-25. 
Defendant, however, points to no inconsistencies, biases, or ulterior motives not already 
apparent on the face of the record. 
The jury was aware of the biases and motives of Empey and Farrell. They knew 
Empey was a drug user who offered to help the police for the community good ("to clear the 
streets of drugs"), but was actually a "mercenary" who assisted them in return for money 
(Rl 17: 100-01). They also knew that Empey betrayed not only defendant, who had trusted 
him, but also his own roommate, Farrell (Rl 17: 165). At least one member of the jury was 
puzzled by the risks Empey took for the $200 he earned from both sales and wondered if 
Empey had faced incarceration in this case (R117: 155). Empey's motives were clarified for 
the jury: 
Mr. Empey had been released from prison [at the time of the charged sales] and 
was not arrested on any of the underlying drug charges involved with this 
defendant. He was doing it for the money. A hundred dollars [per successful 
sale] was the going rate. He didn't have any other employment, and so he did 
it. Now, it's up to him to keep his nose clean so he doesn't go to prison and get 
himself in any kind of trouble. . . . He's down there [at the prison] for 
something that has nothing to do with this. 
(R117: 155-56). 
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Similarly, the jury knew that Farrell, a drug user, had been tricked by his roommate 
into assisting the police and ended up arrested, convicted, and incarcerated. In closing, 
defense counsel told the jury, "And [Farrell] wasn't ever subpoenaed to testify and he 
probably wouldn't have testified even if he had been subpoenaed, just like the other guy didn't 
wanna testify because, gees, you know, I'm in prison. I don't wanna get my butt kicked for 
nothing. And I can't say I blame him. So that's what we're dealing with on that" (Rl 18: 53). 
In sum, defense counsel investigated the possibility of compelling Empey to testify and 
reasonably determined no benefit would result. Counsel also knew that Farrell's testimony 
would not aid the defense. The fact that defendant disagrees with his counsel's tactical 
decisions does not establish their deficiency. See Leber, 2007 UT App 273, *f 19 (holding that 
the failure to call an eyewitness who may have provided unfavorable testimony does not 
constitute deficient performance). And in any case, as will be discussed, infra, no prejudice 
resulted from Empey's and Farrell's absence from trial. 
(D) Defense Counsel Reasonably Chose Not to Object to the Admission of 
Empey's and Farrell's Out-of-court Statements Because Any Objection 
Would Have Been Futile. 
Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective when he failed to object when 
Officers Watanabe, Beck, and Schultz testified to Empey's and Farrell's out-of-court 
statements. According to defendant, his counsel's failure to object resulted in the loss of his 
right of confrontation as articulated in Crawford. See Br.Aplt. at 26-27 & 32. 
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As previously discussed, admission of an out-of-court statement is prohibited by the 
Confrontation Clause if the statement (1) is offered for its truth, (2) is testimonial, and(3) was 
made by a non-testifying declarant unless (4) the declarant is legally unavailable to testify and 
(5) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
53-54. Here, defendant's argument that his counsel was deficient because he did not raise a 
Crawford objection to Empey's andFarrell's statements fails for multiple reasons, which will 
be fully discussed below. In sum, however, Empey's and Farrell's statements were not 
offered for their truth and, therefore, did not constitute hearsay. Second, Farrell's statements 
were statements of a co-conspirator and did not constitute hearsay and were not testimonial. 
Third, Farrell's statements were also not testimonial because they were unwittingly made to 
an undercover police officer. Because none of the statements constituted testimonial hearsay, 
there admission was not barred by the Confrontation Clause or any evidentiary rule. Thus, 
objection to their admission would have been futile and defendant's ineffectiveness claim 
necessarily fails. See Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, ^ 30 (reaffirming that "counsel's failure 
to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
assistance" of counsel) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Universally, courts recognize that "if an out-of-court statement is 'offered simply to 
prove that it was made, without regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not prescribed 
by the hearsay rule.'" See Olsen, 869 P.2d at 335. See also Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (defining 
"hearsay" as an out-of-court statement "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
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asserted"). For example, statements made by a confidential informant to a police officer as 
to the location of the defendant were not hearsay because they were "not admitted to prove 
the truth of the information, but rather to explain the conduct of the police in setting up an 
armed stakeout of the home where defendant was found." State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231,233 
(Utah 1987). Similarly, an unidentified citizen informant's statement to a police officer that 
the defendant asked the citizen where he could buy cocaine because he wanted to kill himself 
was not hearsay because it was "evidence of verbal acts" and not admitted for its "substantive 
truth." Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360,365 (Utah App. 1992), affd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 
1994). Nor were the statements of a rape victim and her sister made to a third-party deemed 
hearsay when the statements were not offered to prove the fact of the rape, but only to "show 
the chronology of events leading to the specific incidents at issue." State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 
1207,1211 (Utah App. 1991). For the same reason, a police officer may relate what another 
person told him if it provides background and context to the police officer's subsequent 
actions. Layton v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah App. 1987). Accord United States v. 
Van Sack, 458 F.3d 694, 700-02 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a conversation between a 
confidential informant and the defendant was not hearsay because it only provided 
background and context to the subsequent police actions), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 2158 
(2007); State v. Leyva, 640 S.E.2d 394,398-99 (N.C. App. 2007) (same). In sum, statements 
which only provide background and context do not constitute hearsay—and therefore do not 
43 
implicate confrontation—because they are not admitted for their truth. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2273; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. 
Defendant fails to acknowledge this distinction. He presumes that Empey's and 
Farrelrs statements constituted hearsay but does not address the truth requirement of 
Crawford, rule 801(c), or the above-cited Utah authority. Instead, he simply asserts without 
analysis that hearsay constituted "[virtually the entire substance of evidence produced at 
trial." Br.Aplt. at 24. In his Statement of Facts, defendant identifies eight out-of-court 
statements he claims violated his right of confrontation: 
(1) "Officer Watanabe testified that the confidential informant [Empey] 'stated 
that he could purchase heroin from Ray,9" see Br.Aplt. at 9 (citing Rl 17: 97); 
(2) "[Watanabe] testified about the confidential informant's alleged [telephone] 
conversation with the Defendant," see Br.Aplt. at 9 (citing Rl 17: 106); 
(3) "Officer Watanabe listened to the conversation of the recording device [on 
Officer Beck] and testified . . . regarding what occurred during the alleged 
[March] transaction," see Br.Aplt. at 9 (citing Rl 17: 115); 
(4) "Officer Beck also testified that he listened to the confidential informant's 
side of a telephone conversation allegedly made with the Defendant, and 
testified that the confidential informant informed him that the Defendant had 
made the decision where the controlled drug purchase was to occur," see 
Br.Aplt. At 10 (citing Rl 17: 130-31); 
(5) "Officer Watanabe again testified regarding telephone conversation he 
overheard involving John Empey. During this conversation Mr. Empey 
apparently told the officer that he had arranged another drug deal," see Br.Aplt. 
at 10-11 (citing Rl 17: 165); 
(6) "Apparently John Empey had a conversation by phone with an individual 
by the name of Robert Farrell. Again,... the officer testified as to the content 
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of the conversation in which the second drug purchase was discussed," see 
Br.Aplt. at 11 (citing Rl 17: 167); 
(7) "One of these conversations resulted in the officer testifying that this 
particular buy was to occur in the parking lot of Shopko [Stop & Shop]," see 
Br.Aplt. at 11 (no record citation); 
(8) "Officer Shultz then . . . offered hearsay testimony regarding the previous 
buy although he was not involved in that purchase/' see Br.Aplt. at 11 (citing 
R117: 190). 
None of the identified statements were offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and, 
thus, they do not constitute hearsay and do not implicate confrontation. See Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 59 n.9; Utah R. Evid. 801(c). 
None of the statements described the crimes at issue. The statements only described 
what Empey and Farrell did in setting up the drug sales. The statements also explained why 
Beck went to Stimson's and approached defendant in the parking lot and why Schultz and the 
surveillance team were at the Stop & Shop. But it was the police officers' eyewitness 
accounts of what happened once they were at those locations that established the charged 
crimes. See Statement of Facts at 6-9 (relating only the police eyewitness accounts of the 
sales). 
Defendant also asserts that Empey provided the only "unifying thread" in establishing 
the two sales because the police only witnessed portions of each transaction. See Br.Aplt. at 
24. This wholly ignores Officer's Beck eyewitness account of his essentially hand-to-hand 
buy from defendant in March. See Statement of Facts at 6-8. It also ignores that Empey left 
the scene before the May sale occurred. See id. at 8-9. And while the surveillance officers 
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could not see the object actually exchanged during the May sale, the officers' combined 
testimony established that Farrell was given $100 in police money to buy heroin just before 
he met defendant and that immediately after meeting defendant, Farrell possessed heroin 
packaged identically to the heroin defendant sold in March and defendant now had the $ 100. 
See id. at 8-9. None of this eyewitness and physical evidence involved Empey's or Farrell's 
statements. 
Likewise, Empey's statement that defendant no longer trusted him, but that his 
roommate Farrell could buy from defendant was not offered for its truth, but to explain why 
Officer Shultz drove Farrell to Ogden and gave him $100. Farrell's statements to Schultz 
during the drive fall into the same category: they simply explained why Schultz and the 
surveillance team were at the Stop and Shop. The truth of these statements was irrelevant, 
however, because it was the surveillance team's eyewitness observations and seizure of the 
physical evidence which established the May crimes. 
In addition to not being hearsay, Farrell's statements were not testimonial and, 
therefore, did not implicate confrontation. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273 (recognizing that the 
Confrontation Clause only bars testimonial hearsay); Williams, 2005 UT App 493, f^t| 11-17 
(same). Statements made unwittingly to a police officer are not testimonial. See Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 58. Nor are statements made by a co-conspirator during the course of the crime. 
Id. (citing Bowjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987) and holding that a co-
conspirator's statement made in the course of the conspiracy is neither hearsay nor 
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testimonial). See also Utah R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E) (defining as non-hearsay a statement made 
by a co-conspirator during the commission of the crime). 
Here, Farrell was an unwitting informant who did know Schultz was a police officer. 
See Statement of Facts at 8-9. Additionally, Farrell was defendant's accomplice and co-
conspirator. See State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184,185 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing that "any 
act in furtherance of arranging to distribute a controlled substance" constitutes distribution) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Under either theory, 
Farrell's statements to Schultz were not constitutionally barred or otherwise inadmissible. See 
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223,224-251 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the admission 
of a co-conspirator's statement does not implicate confrontation or violate evidentiary rules); 
United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 183 (3rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a statement 
made unwittingly to the police does not implicate confrontation or violate evidentiary rules). 
Accord United States v. Moneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 
1345-47 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ayala, 469 F.Supp.2d 357,361-62 (W.D. Va. 2007) 
(same).8 
8Whether Empey's statements were testimonial is a closer question. See Williams, 
2005 UT App 493, \ 17 & \ 18 n.4 (recognizing that statements may be testimonial if a 
reasonable person would assume that the "statement might be used in the investigation or 
prosecution of a crime," but not fully determining what constitutes a testimonial 
statement); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 670-71 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 
confidential informant's statement to the police is testimonial and barred under Crawford 
if offered for its truth). This issue need not be decided here because even if Empey's 
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In sum, defendant has failed to establish that his counsel's decision not to object to 
Empey's and Farreli's statements was deficient. Empey's statements were not offered for 
their truth, but to provide context and background to the police testimony. Likewise, Farreli's 
statements were not offered for their truth and, in any case, did not constitute testimonial 
statements because he was an unwitting informant and defendant's co-conspirator. As such, 
the admission of the statements did not offend the Confrontation Clause, 
(E) In Any Case, No Prejudice Resulted from the Absence of Empey or 
Farrell or the Admission of their Statements. 
Even if defendant established any deficiency in counsel's performance, he has not 
established prejudice. His ineffectiveness claim, therefore, necessarily fails. See discussion 
of standard at 14-15. 
There is no basis on this record to presume that if Empey or Farrell had testified, that 
either would have provided exculpatory information or would have otherwise contradicted the 
prosecution's evidence. Nor is there any basis to presume that biases, motives, or 
inconsistencies, beyond those established by the record, would have been shown if either had 
testified. To the contrary, their absence from trial allowed the defense to argue that the jury 
should discredit their roles. 
statements were testimonial, they were not offered for their truth. See Crawford, 541 
U.S. at59n.9. 
For similar reasons, the issue of Empey's or Farreli's availability need not be 
decided. Though defendant admits that they could be considered unavailable witnesses, 
see Br.Aplt. at 26 (citing rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence), the issue is of no 
consequence here because their statements are not testimonial hearsay. 
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Similarly, even if their statements had been excluded, other strong, even 
overwhelming, evidence established defendant's guilt. See Statement of Facts at 6-9. 
Empey's and FarrelPs statements only explained why the officers were at Stimson's and Stop 
& Shop actively observing defendant. The statements, however, did not establish the crimes 
charged. The requisite elements of defendant's crimes were established only through the 
police officers' eyewitness accounts of the two sales and by the physical evidence, which 
included the five baggies of heroin sold to Beck, the five identically packaged baggies of 
heroin found on Farrell, the pre-recorded $100 bill given to Farrell by Schultz and found 
inside defendant's wallet, and the 6.1 grams of heroin found on defendant when arrested. See 
id. In sum, regardless of Empey's and Farrell's presence at trial or the admission of their out-
of-court statements, the outcome here is the same. See Marble, 2007 UT App 82, \ 12 
(reaffirming that even when deficient performance is established, prejudice must also be 
shown to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
POINTIII 
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION 
HERE BECAUSE THERE ARE NO MULTIPLE ERRORS AND NO 
CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE. 
The cumulative error doctrine permits an appellate court to reverse a conviction when 
multiple errors are established, that though individually harmless, have the "cumulative 
effect" of undermining confidence that a "fair trial was had." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. Here, 
defendant has established no errors, much less multiple errors. Nor has he shown that absent 
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the errors he alleges, there exists a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. Id. 
at 1208-09. There is, therefore, no basis to apply the cumulative error doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
R U L E 4 0 3 . EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
R U L E 4 0 4 . CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a 
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused 
and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of 
the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution 
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to sh6w action 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the 
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good 
cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998; November 1, 2001.] 
RULE 801 . DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement'' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant0 is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay'' is a statement, other than one made by the declar-
ant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the 
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness 
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, 
or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an 
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by 
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by 
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) 
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.] 
RULE 804. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situa-
tions in which the declarant: 
(a)(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(a)(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(a)(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(a)(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(a)(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's 
statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or 
other reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of 
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing 
of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(b)(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(b)(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(b)(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be 
true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(b)(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning 
the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship 
by blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the 
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the 
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2004,] 
